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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the court of appeals correctly hold that issues of material fact precluded summary 
judgment? 
II. Did the court of appeals correctly hold that whether a principal may be held liable for the 
unauthorized acts of an agent based on the doctrine of apparent authority is a factual question? 
OPINION BELOW 
The unpublished memorandum decision of the court of appeals, Brgoch v. Harry, Case 
No. 950238-CA (Utah Ct. App., filed April 18, 1996), is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs filed their complaint in this action against Defendants Harry 
and Private Ledger Financial Services, Inc., Linsco Financial Services, Inc. and Linsco/Private 
Ledger Corporation (collectively referred to as "Private Ledger") on March 17, 1992. (R. 2-8) 
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed on December 31, 1992, alleged four causes of action 
against Defendant Harry, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, securities violations 
and fraud.1 (R. 288-302) Brgoch and Isaacs also alleged that Private Ledger breached its 
fiduciary duty to them, was negligent with respect to their accounts, and committed various 
securities violations. (R. 288-302) The primary basis for the plaintiffs' allegations against 
Private Ledger arose from the fact that Defendant Harry was an agent for Private Ledger and 
defendant Harry is not a party to this appeal. Harry was subsequently convicted of criminal charges 
arising from his actions in this case. State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thereafter, 
Harry filed for bankruptcy (R. 395) which was twice dismissed. Harry has agreed to be bound by the 
ruling of the appellate court pursuant to an agreement between Plaintiffs and Harry and the order of the 
court. (R. 834-36) 
that Private Ledger bestowed authority on Harry. Because plaintiffs were harmed by Harry's 
actions undertaken pursuant to the apparent authority bestowed upon him by Private Ledger, 
plaintiffs asserted that Private Ledger was liable for Harry's actions. (R. 288-302) 
After the deadline set by the trial court for filing pretrial motions had expired, Defendant 
Private Ledger filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 405-07) In its motion for summary 
judgment, Private Ledger argued that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims had expired 
and that Private Ledger was not liable for Defendant Harry's actions because Harry was acting 
outside of Private Ledger's control and the scope of his authority at the time he committed the 
acts which were the subject of this action. (R. 408-561) In response, plaintiffs argued that 
disputed issues of fact concerning when plaintiffs discovered Harry's misconduct foreclosed 
application of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, plaintiffs asserted that Private Ledger was 
liable for Harry's actions because he was acting as an agent for his principal, Private Ledger, 
and was acting under the apparent authority granted to him by Private Ledger. (R. 580-621) 
Following a hearing on Private Ledger's motion for summary judgment (R. 676), the trial 
court denied that portion of the motion that related to the statute of limitations but granted the 
motion with respect to the issue of Private Ledger's liability for its agent's actions. (R. 666, 
820-22) The trial court ruled that "The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of 
defrauding Private Ledger crystallizes my opinion that one cannot be an agent of the principal 
at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are mutually 
exclusive actions and terms." (R. 684, 848) Therefore, the trial court ruled that Private Ledger 
was not liable for Defendant Harry's actions. 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion and memorandum for reconsideration or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial. (R. 682-701) Plaintiffs argued that the trial court's ruling was 
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contrary to existing law because it ignored the doctrine of apparent authority. Additionally, 
plaintiffs asserted that disputed issues of material fact remained which precluded summary 
judgment in the case. (R. 682-701) The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration. (R. 820-25) Two separate orders, one granting Private Ledger's motion for 
summary judgment and the other denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration were signed by 
the trial court on November 21, 1994. (R. 821-22, 823-24) 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to certify the court's orders as final and appealable. (R. 804-06) 
However, counsel for plaintiffs and Defendant Harry stipulated to a dismissal of the action 
against Defendant Harry. (R. 834-36) Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs then appealed. 
In their appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial court's ruling that Private Ledger was not 
liable was contrary to existing law because it ignored the doctrine of apparent authority and that 
issues of material fact regarding apparent authority precluded summary judgment. In an 
unpublished memorandum decision issued on April 18, 1996, the court of appeals held that the 
trial court's reasoning to the effect that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the same time 
engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent" was simply an incorrect statement of law. 
Brgoch. slip op. at 2. The court reasoned that the general rule is that the principal is liable for 
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during the existence of an agency 
relationship and within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority. Brgoch, slip op. 
at 1. Furthermore, the court of appeals held that questions of fact remained as to the existence 
of the agency relationship between Harry and Private Ledger and the scope of Harry's apparent 
authority. The court of appeals stated that whether an agency relationship exists and the extent 
of that agency relationship are generally questions of fact in all but the clearest cases. Brgoch, 
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slip op. at 2. Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in Private Ledger's petition for writ of certiorari is 
misleading for two reasons. First, that statement of facts does not set forth all facts "relevant 
to the issues presented for review" as required by Rule 49(a)(8) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Second, Private Ledger's statement of facts absolutely ignores the standard of 
review which the court of appeals was required to apply in this case. This case was decided in 
the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the court of appeals was required 
on the appeal to view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the losing parties on 
summary judgment. K & T. Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994); Higgins v. Salt 
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). The following facts are relevant to the 
disposition of this petition and are presented as the court of appeals was required by the standard 
of review to view them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 
Defendant Ronald Allen Harry ("Harry") was a registered agent and branch manager of 
Defendant Private Ledger's Salt Lake City branch office from January 1988 until November 
1989. Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs had utilized Harry's services at his prior brokerage firm, 
Prudential Bache, and used his services at Private Ledger. (R. 493, 499-500) Brgoch and 
Isaacs were retired airline pilots, had been long-time friends and had many similar interests (R. 
494, 500) Harry managed their retirement portfolios while he worked as the branch manager 
at the Salt Lake City office of Private Ledger (R. 600, 605) Harry's business cards, stationery, 
and title at the office held Harry out as the branch manager of Private Ledger in Salt Lake City. 
(R. 602, 607) 
Despite instructions from Brgoch and Isaacs that none of their funds should be invested 
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in high-risk or partnership investments, in May of 1988, Harry invested portions of Brgoch's 
and Isaacs's portfolios in an Arizona partnership which purchased unimproved real property for 
potential development.2 (R. 436, 453, 600-02, 605-07) Harry, without the knowledge or 
permission of either Brgoch or Isaacs, caused substantial amounts of their IRA funds to be 
transferred from their Private Ledger account to a bank in Onaga, Kansas. (R. 600, 605) This 
transfer was effectuated only because Harry forged the plaintiffs' signatures on transfer 
documents. (R.601-02, 606-07) Brgoch and Isaacs, not sophisticated or knowledgeable 
investors by any definition, were not provided with a prospectus or an explanation of the 
investment and were only told that the investment was short term, low risk, and provided 
suitable returns.3 (R. 600-01, 605-06) Brgoch and Isaacs were given this information only after 
Harry made the investment and transferred the funds. Brgoch and Isaacs did not find out about 
the forged documents until some time later. (R. 601-02, 606-07) Brgoch and Isaacs were told 
that the investment was a one-time-only investment which would require no further investment 
on their part. (R. 600, 605) In actuality, the investment required annual assessments of $17,000 
to be contributed by each investor over a period of up to thirteen years. When notice of the first 
2The limited partnership in which Harry invested plaintiffs' money, Red River Mountain Limited 
Partnership ("Red River"), was not approved by Private Ledger. According to Private Ledger, agents 
were not permitted to sell securities which had not been approved by Private Ledger unless the agent 
received permission. An agent's sale of unapproved securities is referred to as "selling away." State v 
Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
3Private Ledger's petition refers to Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs as "experienced investors." Petition 
at 3. However, Private Ledger fails to disclose that this issue was presented to the trial court which ruled 
that the issue was one of material fact. (R. 285) When an issue is resolved by the trial court against a 
party, that party should raise the issue on direct or cross-appeal. State v. South. 885 P.2d 795, 798 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert granted. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); and Henrettv v. Manti City Corp.. 791 
P.2d 506, 511 (Utah 1990). Private Ledger did not appeal or cross-appeal the trial court's disposition 
of this issue. Because this issue was decided by the trial court adversely to Private Ledger, Private 
Ledger should not now be stating facts which are contrary to the court's ruling which it did not dispute. 
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assessments arrived, Brgoch and Isaacs complained to Harry. Harry told Brgoch and Isaacs to 
ignore the assessment, that a mistake had been, and that he would take care of the matter. (R. 
601, 606) Harry was later charged with various criminal securities violations and was convicted 
of four counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-1 and -21 (1989), and 
his conviction was subsequently affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals in April, 1994. State 
v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The first three counts pertained to criminal 
conduct Harry against three individual investors, including Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs. 873 
P.2d at 1155. The fourth count on which Harry was convicted alleged that Harry committed 
fraud against Private Ledger. 873 P.2d at 1156. On appeal, Harry challenged this count, but 
the conviction was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals which held that Private Ledger had 
suffered harm at Harry's hands because it did not receive commissions that ordinarily would be 
due it and because Private Ledger would be exposed to "potential lawsuits from disgruntled 
investors," such as Brgoch and Isaacs, due to Harry's actions. 873 P.2d at 1157. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Private Ledger argued that Harry was prevented 
by an agreement with Private Ledger from selling the kind of investments which he sold Brgoch 
and Isaacs. Private Ledger claimed that Harry did not have the authority to invest clients' funds 
in Red River. (R. 415) In response to the motion for summary judgment, Brgoch and Isaacs 
argued that they believed Harry was acting on behalf of Private Ledger and under the authority 
granted to him by Private Ledger. Both Brgoch and Isaacs provided affidavits that stated that 
Harry held himself out as manager of the Salt Lake office of Private Ledger and that their 
dealings with Harry occurred at the Salt Lake offices of Private Ledger. (R. 601, 602, 606, 
607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs each received statements from Private Ledger noting that 
funds and been transferred from their account. Finally, both Brgoch and Isaacs affirmatively 
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stated that they were never told that Harry was acting as any type of independent contractor and 
that they were only told and informed by Harry's business cards, letterhead, and office notations 
that Harry was the manager of the Private Ledger Salt Lake City branch. (R. 602, 607) 
Furthermore, another broker in the Salt Lake City office, Cregg Cannon, provided an affidavit 
which stated that Cannon had raised the issue of selling outside limited partnerships to officials 
of Private Ledger on at least one occasion and that he was led to believe that Private Ledger, 
while not officially sanctioning the conduct, would "look the other way" when such conduct 
occurred. (R. 618-19) Cannon specifically stated, "My impression was that they [Private 
Ledger] didn't care about such action and that the action went on from various representatives 
and that if, in fact, I sold private securities they didn't want to know or be informed about those 
sales." (R. 619) Cannon also stated that Private Ledger's supervision over its agents and 
officers was nonexistent. (R. 619) Such nonexistent supervision facilitated Private Ledger's 
position of not wanting to know the actions of its agents/managers. Therefore, Brgoch and 
Isaacs argued that Harry had apparent authority to make all the investments which were made 
from funds in their accounts. (R. 595-96, 686-93) The trial court rejected these arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IN THIS CASE WAS 
CORRECT BECAUSE PRIVATE LEDGER'S CLAIM DEPENDS 
ON DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Nowhere in its petition does Private Ledger state that the court of appeals was 
constrained by the standard of review to view the facts of the case in the light most favorable 
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to the losing parties in the trial court, Plaintiffs Brgoch and Isaacs.4 When the court of appeals 
found disputed issues of material fact to exist, it was required to reverse the summary judgment. 
Private Ledger's petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seems to indicate that the court of 
appeals decided important legal questions which have seemingly broad application far beyond 
the ambit of this case. However, in reality, the court of appeals' decision stands for two narrow 
propositions. First, the court of appeals held that whether an agency relationship exists and the 
scope of the agent's authority are questions of fact to be decided by the trier of fact in all but 
the clearest cases. Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Secondly, the court of appeals decided that "Questions 
of fact remain as to the existence of the agency relationship between Harry and [Private Ledger] 
and the scope of Harry's authority." Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Simply stated, all the court of 
appeals decided was that the trial court should not have decided this case on summary judgment. 
A comparison of the facts set forth by Private Ledger in its petition and the facts set forth 
in this brief in opposition reveals the accuracy of the court of appeals' holding. For example, 
Private Ledger's petition states, "The transfer of plaintiffs' funds to bank accounts in their name 
in Kansas was entirely proper." Petition at 5. In fact, Private Ledger fails to disclose that the 
transfer was effectuated only because its agent, Defendant Harry, forged the plaintiffs' signatures 
on the transfer documents. (R. 601-02, 606-07) The issue of whether the forgery could have 
been spotted by comparison of the signatures on the transfer documents to plaintiffs' actual 
signatures on file with Private Ledger has not yet been the subject of discovery in this case. 
4At one point in its petition, Private Ledger claims that the court of appeals failed to "adhere to Rule 
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . ." Petition at 10. In fact, Private Ledger fails to 
acknowledge that plaintiffs submitted affidavits pertaining to the issues on summary judgment. Thus the 
requirements of Rule 56(e) were clearly satisfied. See, ej^, Thavne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 
120, 124 (Utah 1994) (Rule 56 (e) only requires the nonmoving party to produce some evidence, such 
as affidavits, in response to a summary judgment motion.) 
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Private Ledger now knows that the transfer was effectuated only through its agent's fraud. At 
another point, Private Ledger states, "[Plaintiffs] do not contend that Private Ledger had any 
knowledge of the Red River investments prior to or at the time those investments were made." 
Petition at 5. This statement overlooks the larger issue of "selling away" and ignores evidence 
presented to the trial court by the plaintiffs which indicated that Private Ledger was aware of 
the practice of "selling away" by its agents and did little to control the practice. (R. 618-19) 
These instances demonstrate that disputed issues of fact remain regarding virtually all of the 
issues in this case and that summary judgment should have been foreclosed, as the court of 
appeals correctly held. 
II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE APPLICABLE LAW 
ON THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY. 
The main thrust of Private Ledger's petition in this Court is that the court of appeals did 
not properly apply the doctrine of apparent authority and that it misconstrued one of its own 
cases and ignored cases from other jurisdictions. Each of these claims is wrong. 
A* The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that the Trial Court Ignored the Doctrine of 
Apparent Authority In Its Ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion. 
When it ruled in favor of Private Ledger, the trial court erroneously focused on the 
actions of Defendant Harry with respect to Private Ledger rather on the authority apparent to 
plaintiffs which Private Ledger had bestowed upon Harry, its agent. In addition, the trial court 
misinterpreted the law when it relied on the fact that Private Ledger had also been a victim of 
Defendant Harry. In ruling in favor of Defendant Harry, the trial court stated: 
. . . In essence, it appears that when a registered representative of a 
brokerage firm clearly violates the firm's policies and engages in unauthorized 
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activities without the knowledge of Private Ledger in this matter, I just cannot see 
how liability can be imposed upon the principal, Private Ledger, in this matter. 
The fact that Mr. Harry was criminally convicted of defrauding Private 
Ledger crystallizes my opinion in that one cannot be an agent of the principal at 
the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent. They are 
mutually exclusive actions and terms. 
(R. 847-48) This reasoning was also incorporated into the trial court's written order. (R. 821) 
In reversing the trial court's summary judgment, the court of appeals stated that the trial 
court produced no authority to support the proposition that "one cannot be an agent of the 
principal at the same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as to Private 
Ledger." Brgoch, slip op. at 1. The court of appeals also said it was aware of no such 
authority. Rather, the court of appeals stated that "The general rule is that a principal is liable 
for injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during the existence of the agency 
and within the scope of the agent's actual or apparent authority." Brgoch, slip op. at 1 (citations 
omitted). Finally, the court of appeals stated, "Simply because the agent commits an act that 
is criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all responsibility vis-a-vis an 
innocent third party." Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Applying these principles, the court of appeals 
concluded that the trial court incorrectly reasoned that Harry could not be an agent of Private 
Ledger if he engaged in conduct which was criminally fraudulent. Brgoch, slip op. at 2. Now, 
in its petition to this Court, Private Ledger argues that the court of appeals somehow misapplied 
agency concepts in its decision. Private Ledger's assertion is simply incorrect. 
The trial court's ruling totally discounted the concept of apparent authority. An agency 
relationship arises when one party, the principal, demonstrates an intention that another party, 
the agent, shall act on his behalf. The statements or actions of the agent can bind the principal. 
United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 1990). The principal can invest an agent 
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with at least two types of authority. "Actual" authority is "That authority the agent reasonable 
thinks she possesses based on the principal's dealings with her." Select Creations. Inc. v. 
Paliafito America. Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1223, 1233 (E.D. Wis. 1993). If an agent lacks actual 
authority to perform specific actions, the agent's actions may still bind the principal, if the agent 
has apparent authority. "Apparent" authority "arises when the agent does not possess actual or 
implied authority to act for the principal in the matter, but the principal has clothed the agent 
with apparent authority to act for the principal in that particular act. In other words, the 
principal permits the agent to appear to have the authority to bind the principal." Badger v. 
Paulson Inv. Co.. 803 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Or. 1991). Utah has long recognized the concept of 
apparent authority. See, e j ^ , Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co.. 442 P.2d 921, 
923 n.3 (Utah 1968) ("[Principals are generally bound by acts of their agents which fall within 
the apparent scope of their authority and will be bound where innocent third parties have dealt 
with the agent in good faith."); Harrison v. Auto Securities Co.. 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927). 
In correcting the trial court's misapplication of the law, the court of appeals applied its 
prior case of Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat. 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Horrocks. 
which is discussed below, held that basic agency law requires that the principal be bound by the 
acts of an agent clothed with apparent authority even when the agent's acts adversely impact the 
principal. 892 P.2d at 15. In Horrocks. the court of appeals stated that if a loss is to be 
suffered because of the misconduct of an agent, the loss should be "borne by those who put it 
in his power to do the wrong." 892 P.2d at 16-17. The court of appeals correctly applied 
Horrocks to this case in its analysis of the trial court's actions. 
The trial court's concerns that Private Ledger had also been a victim of Harry's 
fraudulent activities and that Private Ledger attempted to control Harry are clearly contrary to 
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Horrocks and other authorities. Indeed, there is ample support for the proposition that 
misconduct by the agent against innocent third parties will bind the principal even if the principal 
does not benefit or is harmed by the agent's misconduct or even if the misconduct is specifically 
forbidden by the principal. 
For example, the Restatement (Second) of Agency §161 (1958), plainly states that a 
principal can be responsible for the acts of an agent even where the acts are forbidden by the 
principal. The Restatement provides: 
A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his 
principal to liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are 
incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although 
they are forbidden by the principal, the other party reasonably believes the agent 
is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized. 
Courts have applied this provision to situations identical to the one in this case to find a 
brokerage firm liable. 
For example, in Hollowav v. Howerdd. 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976) the 6th 
Circuit cited §161 of the Restatement as a basis for imposing liability on a brokerage firm when 
its agent, acting on his own volition, sold unregistered stock, a situation identical to this case. 
The court held, inter alia, that those purchasers of the unregistered stock "knew of [the agent's] 
status with [the brokerage firm] and who were without knowledge that he was acting separately 
from [the brokerage firm] were permitted to recover [from the brokerage firm]." 536 F.2d at 
696. In explaining the basis for its holding, the court stated: 
The liability of [the brokerage firm] is premised in the theory that 'if one appoints 
an agent to conduct a series of transactions over a period of time, it is fair that 
he should bear losses that are incurred when such an agent, although without 
authority to do so, does something which is usually done in connection with the 
transactions he is employed to conduct.' 
There was no proof that [the brokerage firm] 'usually' engaged in the sale 
of unregistered stock. 
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[The brokerage firm], however, had an affirmative obligation to prevent 
the use of the prestige of its firm to defraud the investing public. When its agents 
are dealing individually in the sale of securities [the brokerage firm] must be 
clearly disassociated from those transactions, as otherwise it will incur liability 
on the basis of respondeat superior for the fraudulent representations of its agents. 
536 F.2d at 696, citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §161, comment a (1958). 
The situation described by §161 and covered by Hollowav is precisely what occurred 
here. Harry was a general agent for Private Ledger. Private Ledger was a disclosed principal. 
Harry's act of "selling" Red River was an act which would appear to Brgoch and Isaacs to be 
in the normal course of business which Harry appeared to be authorized to perform by Private 
Ledger. Therefore, even if the selling of Red River was forbidden by Private Ledger, it would 
nevertheless be liable under §161 of the Restatement and the reasoning of Hollowav. To the 
plaintiffs, whose point of view should have been assumed by the trial court but was not, 
Defendant Harry had apparent authority derived from his managerial position with Private 
Ledger to deal in the securities at issue. Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt with Harry at the 
Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. When they needed to contact Harry, they contacted him 
at the Private Ledger office. Harry's business cards and letterhead announced Harry as manager 
for the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs 
were never informed that Harry was acting on his own behalf or even that he could have acted 
on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607) For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry acted only 
on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. 
The trial court neglected the doctrine of apparent authority as espoused by the 
Restatement and cases which support it when it granted summary judgment. The court of 
appeals appropriately corrected the trial court's misunderstanding of the law. 
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B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Construed Horrocks v. Westfalia in Deciding This Case. 
Private Ledger claims that the court of appeals misconstrued one of its earlier decisions 
in deciding this case. In fact, when that decision is examined, it is evident that the court of 
appeals not only correctly interpreted Horrocks, but that Horrocks determines the outcome of 
this case. In Horrocks v. Westfalia Svstemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), which was 
not available to the trial court at the time of its ruling, the plaintiff Garold Horrocks was a dairy 
farmer in Wayne County, Utah. Westfalia was an Illinois company which sold dairy equipment 
and Wayne Buchanan was a dealer who represented Westfalia in Utah for a number of years. 
Buchanan, acting as an agent for Westfalia, entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of 
several thousand dollars worth of milking equipment. Horrocks made only partial payment for 
the equipment but received only part of the equipment. 892 P.2d at 15. A few months after 
the contracts had been signed, Buchanan, the agent, presented Horrocks with a receipt and 
acknowledgment which stated that Horrocks had in fact received all of the equipment which had 
been ordered. Horrocks signed the acknowledgment and receipt without reading it. However, 
at the time, both Horrocks and Buchanan knew that the balance of the equipment had not been 
delivered. Subsequently, Buchanan presented the acknowledgment to Westfalia who in turn paid 
Buchanan $14,000.00. 892 P.2d at 15. Unbeknownst to Horrocks and Westfalia, Buchanan 
then left the area apparently "making off with the undelivered equipment and cash." Id. After 
a few months when the balance of the equipment had not been delivered, Horrocks telephoned 
Westfalia and complained. The court of appeals noted that this telephone call from Horrocks 
was the first knowledge that Westfalia had that the acknowledgment presented to it by Buchanan 
was false. Shortly thereafter, Horrocks filed suit against Westfalia alleging breach of contract, 
and Westfalia counterclaimed for the entire amount owed under the contract. 
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The court of appeals stated that the central issue in Horrocks was whether "Westfalia 
should bear the responsibility for the unauthorized, adverse acts of its agent." 892 P.2d at 15. 
In the case, Westfalia made the argument that Buchanan, Westfalia's agent, was acting outside 
the scope of his authority, was acting in his own self-interest, and that his actions were adverse 
to Westfalia. Id- This is exactly the argument which Private Ledger has made with respect to 
its agent, Defendant Harry. In Horrocks, the court of appeals soundly rejected Westfalia's 
argument. The court stated that basic agency law requires that a principal be bound by the acts 
of an agent clothed with apparent authority. 892 P.2d at 15. The court stated that even when 
an agent's acts adversely impact its principal, the principal is still liable for the agent's actions 
as against an unknowing and innocent third party.5 Specifically, the court of appeals stated: 
The loss that results from Buchanan's misconduct must be borne by the party who 
empowered Buchanan to commit the wrong. "Where a loss is to be suffered 
through the misconduct of an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in his 
power to do the wrong." County of Macon v. Shores. 397 U.S. 272, 279, 24 
L.ed 889, 890 (1877); see also Vickers. 607 P.2d at 607; Harrison. 257 P. at 
679-80. Westfalia placed Buchanan in the position to perpetrate a fraud. 
Consequently, Westfalia must bear the responsibility for Buchanan's misconduct. 
The trial court did not err by placing liability on Westfalia under the theory of 
apparent authority. 
. . . Even when the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the 
knowledge of the agent may still be imputed to the principal. 
892 P.2d at 16-17. The court of appeals clearly adopted the position, supported by abundant 
5This general principle of agency law, that a principal is bound by the acts of its agents as against 
innocent third parties, was recognized long ago by the Utah Supreme Court. In Harrison v. Auto 
Securities Co.. 257 P. 677 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is a general principle of the law of agency, running through all contracts made by 
agents with third parties, that the principals are bound by the acts of their agents which 
fall within the apparent scope of authority of the agents, and that the principals will not 
be permitted to deny the authority of their agents against innocent third parties, who dealt 
with those agents in good faith. 
275 P. at 679. 
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authority, that a principal who cloaks an agent with apparent authority must suffer the loss due 
to an agent's misconduct even when the agent's misconduct has harmed the principal itself. 
The court of appeals cited Horrocks in its opinion in this case. The similarities between 
the two cases are inescapable. In Horrocks, the court of appeals analyzed the facts which led 
the plaintiff to believe that Buchanan was acting within his authority when he committed the 
fraudulent actions. 892 P.2d 16. In this case also, the facts are abundantly clear that the 
plaintiffs perceived Defendant Harry to be cloaked with the apparent authority by Private Ledger 
to invest their money in Red River. To plaintiffs, Defendant Harry had apparent authority 
derived from his managerial position with Private Ledger to deal in the securities at issue. 
The trial court's concerns that Private Ledger had also been a victim of Harry's 
fraudulent activities and that Private Ledger attempted to control Harry are clearly contrary to 
Horrocks and therefore the court of appeals was correct in relying on Horrocks to determine the 
outcome of this case. 
C. Even a Cursory Examination of Cases from other Jurisdictions Cited by Private Ledger 
Demonstrates that They Do Not Support Private Ledger's Position. 
In its petition to this Court, Private Ledger asserts that cases from other jurisdictions 
support its position in this matter. In fact, when these cases are subjected to even modest 
scrutiny, the reader quickly ascertains that those cases to not support Private Ledger's position. 
The first case cited, but not discussed, by Private Ledger is Bates v. Shearson Lehman 
Bros. Inc., 42 F. 3d 79 (1st Cir. 1994). That case is easily distinguishable on its facts. There, 
the first circuit expressly held that there was no evidence of any representation or conduct to 
suggest to the plaintiff that the agent had authority to act for the principal. The court stated that 
the agent, while working for the principal, never opened an account with the principal for the 
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plaintiff. The agent always visited the plaintiff's home to procure money from her; she never 
went to an office. Checks issued by the plaintiff were never made payable to the principal but 
rather were always made payable to the agent's personal bank. Finally, the agent "never 
expressly told or otherwise represented to [plaintiff] that her funds would be invested with [the 
principal]." 42 F.3d at 82. Furthermore, the court stated that the principal had no way of 
knowing of the existence of the plaintiff because the agent never opened an account for the 
plaintiff. Id. Indeed, the facts of Bates seem to suggest that it is doubtful that the plaintiff even 
knew that the agent worked for the principal. In contrast, in this case, Plaintiffs Brgoch and 
Isaacs routinely visited Private Ledger's office when they sought to deal with Defendant Harry. 
Harry's business cards and letterhead announced that he was the manager for Private Ledger. 
Brgoch and Isaacs had an account with Private Ledger. Even the fraudulent transfers of funds 
appeared on a Private Ledger account statement. For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, 
Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and under its control and authority. Private 
Ledger's claim that this case is indistinguishable from Bates is simply incorrect. 
Private Ledger also cites Hauser v. FarrelL 14 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1994), to support its 
argument. However, as Private Ledger acknowledged in its amended brief in the court of 
appeals, a significant fact in Hauser distinguishes it from this case. In Hauser. the 
plaintiffs/investors "did not . . . contradict the brokers' representations that they told the 
customer that the [investment] would not be through [the brokerage firm]." 14 F.3d at 1433. 
In other words, unlike this case where Defendant Harry never informed Brgoch and Isaacs that 
the investment was not sanctioned by Private Ledger nor did Private Ledger inform Brgoch and 
Isaacs that Harry was acting on his own, the defendants in Hauser were specifically informed 
that the defendant brokerage firm did not sanction the investment at issue in that case. In short, 
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Hauser also does not provide any type of support for Private Ledger's argument. 
Finally, Private Ledger's petition discusses FSC Securities Corp. v. McCormack, 630 
So. 2d 979 (Miss. 1994). FSC Securities is also distinguishable from this case. Private Ledger 
does not reveal that FSC Securities was an appeal from a trial, not from summary judgment as 
in this case. FSC Securities, 630 So. 2d at 980. In this case, no trial has been held. 
Additionally, Private Ledger does not disclose that a determinant factor in FSC Securities, on 
which the appellate court based its holding, was the fact that the plaintiffs had noticed that the 
agent in that case was acting for himself rather than for defendant FSC Securities. 630 SO 2d 
at 986. Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme Court cited ample evidence which supported that 
conclusion. For example, as opposed to this case, the agent in FSC Securities met with the 
plaintiffs at their home, not at a place of business. 630 SO 2d at 982. Also, contrary to the 
facts of this case, in FSC Securities the agent's stationery and business cards contain the names 
of both his own company and FSC Securities. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs in that case gave the 
agent checks made out to the agent's own company, not to the defendant FSC Securities. Id. 
All of the foregoing facts distinguish FSC Securities from this case. Here, plaintiffs 
Brgoch and Isaacs only ever dealt with Harry at the Private Ledger office in Salt Lake City. 
When they needed to contact Harry, they contacted him at the Private Ledger office. Harry's 
business cards and letterhead announced Harry as the manager of the Private Ledger office in 
Salt Lake City. (R. 602, 607) Furthermore, Brgoch and Isaacs were never informed that Harry 
was acting on his own behalf or even that he could have acted on his own behalf. (R. 602, 607) 
For all appearances to Brgoch and Isaacs, Harry acted only on behalf of Private Ledger and 
under its control and authority. The record clearly demonstrates that the transfer of funds from 
plaintiffs' Private Ledger accounts was reported to plaintiffs on Private Ledger statement sheets. 
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(R. 600, 605) These facts distinguish this case from FSC Securities. 
D. The Court of Appeals Appropriately Corrected the Trial Court's Ruling. 
Finally, Private Ledger asserts that court of appeals misconstrued the trial court's ruling 
on its motion for summary judgment. In fact, as the foregoing discussion clearly illustrates, the 
trial court simply overlooked or misapplied the doctrine of apparent authority in this case. The 
trial court wrongly concluded that because Private Ledger had also been a "victim" of Defendant 
Harry's fraud, that that fact prevented any potential liability because of Private Ledger's position 
as a principal in this case. As the foregoing discussion amply illustrates, the court of appeals 
corrected this major error on the part of the trial court and correctly concluded that the doctrine 
of apparent authority is applicable to this case and that the scope and extent of Defendant 
Harry's agency relationship with Private Ledger is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Private Ledger's Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be 
denied. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of September, 1996 
NYGAARD, COKE^^NCENT 
RANDY B. COKE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respondents 
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ORME, Presiding Judge: 
The trial court granted defendants1 summary judgment motion, 
concluding that Private Ledger was not liable, as a matter of 
law, for the acts or omissions of defendant Harry. In its order 
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the trial court 
explained that "one cannot be an agent of the principal at the 
same time engaging in conduct which is criminally fraudulent as 
to Private Ledger." However, the trial court cited no authority 
in support of this proposition and we are aware of none. Nor 
have defendants called our attention to any such authority. 
Rather, the general rule is that a principal is liable for 
injuries resulting from the fraud of its agent, committed during 
the existence of the agency and within the scope of the agent' s 
actual or apparent authority. See Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§ 161 (1958); Horrocks v. Westfalia Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 15-16 
(Utah App. 1995); Poulsen v. Treasure State Indus.. Tnrir 626 
P.2d 822, 829 (Mont. 1981). Moreover, whether an agency 
relationship exists and the scope of the agent's authority are 
questions of fact to be determined by a jury in all but the 
clearest cases. Car-ill. Inc. v. Mountain Cement Co.. 891 P.2d 
57, 62 (Wyo. 1995); Mauch v. Kissling. 783 P.2d 601, 605 (Wash. 
App. 1989). Simply because the agent commits an act that is 
criminal does not automatically shield the principal from all 
responsibility vis-a-vis an innocent third party. 
In this case, the trial court's reasoning that "one cannot 
be an agent of the principal at the same time engaging in conduct 
which is criminally fraudulent," is simply not a correct 
statement of the law. Questions of fact remain as to the 
existence of the agency relationship between Harry and defendants 
and the scope of Harry's authority. 
Nor are we able to sustain the judgment on the alternative 
ground urged by defendants before the trial court, namely that 
plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
While traditional application of the discovery rule might suggest 
the claims are time-barred given plaintiffs' concession that they 
knew of some wrongdoing immediately upon receipt of the first 
statement sent by the Bank of Onaga, the result is otnerwise 
given the contention that Harry fraudulently concealed his 
misdeeds. See Berenda v. Lanaford, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1996). See also Sta^ v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149, 1156 (Utah App. 
1994) (noting that "Harry deceived [plaintiffs] both before and 
after the transaction" in question). 
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and remand the case for a trial 
on the merits or such other proceedings as may now be 
appropriate. 
Gregory K^Orme, 
Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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